THE PREDOMINANT STATE?
Today, Joel Migdal sets forth in his seminal work Strong Societies and Weak States, "for those of us in the West, the state has been part of our natural landscape. Its presence, its authority, its place behind so many rules that fashion the minutiae of our lives, have all been so pervasive that it is difficult for us to imagine the situation being otherwise." 1 However, while the state might occupy a privileged place in our collective thinking, its empirical reality in large parts of the world is (and will continue to be) much more complex. Therefore, Migdal cautions: "What may seem as much a part of the natural order as the rivers and the mountains around us is, in fact, an artifact of a small segment of human history."
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In his work, Migdal looks at a kind of politics that does not take place within the framework of the sovereign state. Instead, the actors involved in this process come from groups in society (e.g, ethnic, cultural, local) as well as from state institutions. It is this kind of state-society interaction that lies at the root of the little understood problem of stateness.
In its extreme form, the stateness problem becomes all too visible in the form of the failed state which is unable to rule its territory and its people in any meaningful way. But this occurs only in a minority of countries. Such highly publicized cases notwithstanding, all of which create enormous amounts of human suffering, there are many more instances where the state only has limited authority over many social institutions. Even though some of these states wield formidable military might, they are frequently unable to collect taxes, conduct a census or implement the most basic of policies at the local level. On the whole, these states are unable to govern their rural areas, border regions and hinterlands to any substantial degree.
For example, during Pakistan's recent military campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda supporters in the rugged and mountainous Northwest Frontier Province, the armed forces encountered a problem that at first seems hard to grasp for Western observers. The resident tribes of the Province resolutely opposed the campaign, partly due to a certain sympathy for the aims of the Taliban, but in large parts to assert their tribal authority and autonomy. In other words, the tribes simply did not allow the state to conduct its military affairs as it pleased, but forced the state to negotiate the terms of its campaign. In a treaty between the tribes and the Pakistan government, it was agreed that state officials, including the military, have no authority outside a 100 yard-stretch to both sides of the main highway. rules. As can be seen, the rewards are not only material in nature -using symbols, myths, culture and tradition, social organizations can lend meaning to their members' lives as well.
In the end, the individual, considering the incentives and sanctions, has to decide whether to submit to the authority of a social organization. Since each person is generally a member of many social organizations (or has the chance to become one), they are confronted with a large number of rules. In trying to fulfill their psychological and mundane needs, they construct what Migdal terms "strategies of survival -blueprints for action and belief" 11 . In a situation where no organization can establish a clear hegemony of rule-making, constructing such strategies can be problematic: "Here, individuals must choose among competing components in making their strategies of survival; these are difficult choices when people also face the possibility of competing sanctions."
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In submitting to an organization's rules, the individual invests this particular association with what Migdal terms "social control" 13 over his behaviour. The amount of social control that an organization has is determined by the number of people that follow its rules as well as by the motivations of the people in doing so. This is a matter of degree: an association can exercise greater power when people do not simply follow the rules (compliance), but when they believe them to be right and good (legitimation). to the authority to regulate all social relations within its borders, thus pitting it against all social organizations that would resist this undertaking. The dominant authority determines who will make the rules pertaining to certain segments of the population. This may lead to a shift in the available strategies of survival for the affected individuals.
Such conflict is just as likely to break out over seemingly insignificant issues as over important decisions of national relevance. Migdal provides the following example: "Mustafa Kemal of Turkey locked horns with religious organizations over whether men should wear hats with brims or without. As with so many other skirmishes, the issue was not so inconsequential as it may first appear; over 70 people were hanged for wearing the wrong hats. In reality, the conflict was over who had the right and ability to make rules in that Regarding local implementation, Migdal summarizes his argument as follows: "In brief, I
argue that the structure of society has an important indirect effect on policy implementation.
We have seen how a society with fragmented social control leads to the politics of survival. In turn, I hypothesize, the politics of survival lessens backing and threats of sanctions from supervisors, thus making the implementor more attentive to possible career costs involving strongmen and peer officials. The result is a further weakening of the state's ability to make the rules governing people's behavior." 27 In other words, a weblike society influences politics at the national level which in turn inhibits effective policy implementation at the local level. According to Max Weber, interpersonal relations within society are relations of power and, upon the institutionalization of power, relations of dominance or authority (Herrschaft).
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Such dominance can take place in the framework of associations (Verbände). These organizations construct and enforce a particular order to structure their member's social relations by prescribing or proscribing certain kinds of behavior or forms of interaction among their members or towards outsiders. If said associations are structured through relations of dominance, they are considered Herrschaftsverbände. A special case of these associations of dominance is the political association (politischer Verband) which relies on the use of force to implement its order within a circumscribed territory. The state, finally, is a special kind of political association, characterized by the legitimicy of its "monopoly of physical violence" 32 and the resulting sovereignty within its territory. Cf. Migdal 1988 : 19. Also Migdal 1994 : 11-13 and Migdal 2001 Cf. 
STATE AND SOCIETY AS COMPETING ORDERS
Taking these two approaches together, it is possible to model society as a collection of associations who strive to maximize the reach of their respective orders. The state, as one of these associations, tries to expand its social control over all of society, both geographically and in terms of social structure. To this end, it enters into a struggle of competing orders with social associations who resist the state's attempts to sway their members to join his order. As
Migdal points out, it is all about who gets to make the rules (and whose rules are heeded). assumptions -there were no voluntary acts of association, no social contract; in fact, the general population did not figure much into the equation. Instead, early modern rulers were confronted with alternative power centers (local lords, the rising city bourgeoisie, the clergy) that resisted their attempts to increase the state's reach. Through conflict and accomodation, the state managed to accumulate the authority necessary to become the dominant structure that it is today. But as Charles Tilly emphasizes, the route it took was to a large extent determined by control over the means of violence: "Legitimacy is the probability that other authorities will act to confirm the decisions of a given authority. Other authorities, I might add, are much more likely to confirm the decisions of a challenged authority that controls substantial force; not only fear of retaliation, but also desire to maintain a stable environment recommend that general rule." When one thinks about politics nowadays, the state usually features in a very prominent position. Its predominance in the politics of Western countries and in the daily lives of their citizens is so overwhelming, it is seldom, if ever, questioned at all. Joel Migdal's approach reminds us that the state is nothing more than a certain form of political organization, an institution of society that is highly specific to the current historical context. It also points to the largely forgotten fact that the state does not exist outside or above society, but that it is a part of society, and that these two institutions constantly influence and reshape one another. Furthermore, it brings home the fact that many states do not conform to the ideal type of the strong state that dominates (and clouds) our thinking: strongmen and social authorities exert a strong influence on the outcome of state policies, to the point where such policies might not be implemented at all. The state must either accommodate these forces or try to break their social control. 36 Callaghy 1984: 81. 37 Tilly 1985: 171. Or, as Arthur Stinchcombe put it, "the person over whom power is exercised is not usually as important as other power-holders." (Stinchcombe 1968: 150 ; italics in the original)
Generally, as empirical research on Sub-Saharan Africa has shown, state institutions function more efficiently, "the more they are congruent with informal institutions and norms, the more they are endogenous to their own societies, and the more they are historically embedded in domestic social relations." 38 However, this line of analysis need not be confined to the Third World. It can also be employed when looking at issues of state-society relations and the policy process in developed countries. Corporatist theories of politics, for example, have highlighted the role of interest groups in the policy process, other approaches, such as vetoplayer models, already incorporate selected non-state actors into their analysis.
It would be wrong to think that 'political concepts beyond the nation state' were a research topic that would have to restrict itself to speculations about the future. The fact of the matter is that in many parts of the world, politics are regularly conducted outside of the realm of the state. This should remind us not to generalize the experience of the Western state when thinking about other regions of the globe. In each country, the state has been moulded through its interaction with local social forces. When analyzing these cases and when trying to locate the true seats of power, one should not restrict one's view to the state, but include society's manifold organizations as well. 38 Englebert 1998: 4.
